Prof. Dr. Stefanie Walter
Prof. Dr. Stefanie Walter


My research concentrates on the fields of international and comparative political economy, with a particular focus on how distributional conflicts, policy preferences and institutions affect economic policy outcomes. Thematically, I focus mostly on international financial and monetary relations, and the distributional conflict between the winners and losers of different aspects of the globalization of finance, production, and labor. Most recently, I have become increasingly interested in how interactions between voters and governments shape the politics of disintegration.




Distributional Conflicts and the Politics of Adjustment in the Eurozone Crisis
Project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation


The euro crisis has turned into the most serious challenge the European Union  has ever had to face. Although the causes of the crisis are increasingly well understood, the politics of the crisis are not. This project aims at shedding light on three important puzzles that existing research has not yet been able to resolve. First, why have some governments been able to implement far-reaching reforms, whereas reform progress has been rather spotty in other crisis countries? Second, why have some countries seen serious political turmoil, while others have experienced less public and political opposition? And finally, why have surplus countries been willing to bail out deficit countries, but have varied in their willingness to adjust their own economic policies in an effort the ease the adjustment burden on the South?  
The project argues that these differences can be explained by the variation in societies’ vulnerabilities to different types of policy responses to the crisis. The argument builds on the insight that the euro crisis is, at its root, a balance-of-payments crisis. The imbalances that underlie such crises can be resolved either through significant economic policy adjustments both in the (peripheral) deficit or the (northern) surplus countries, or be addressed by providing external financing to deficit countries. I argue that the resulting distributive struggles surrounding the politics of the euro crisis in surplus and deficit countries are distinct but related, and should therefore be analyzed in a unified framework. The chances for swift and substantial adjustment are enhanced when politically influential interest groups exhibit a low vulnerability to at least one type of adjustment. In contrast, in contexts where significant parts of society are vulnerable to any adjustment, crisis politics is very contentious. Surplus countries with such a vulnerability profile attempt to push most of the adjustment burden onto deficit countries. In return, they are willing to provide external financing to deficit countries, but this generates conflict about on who should bear this financial burden. Since deficit countries are in a weaker position to push adjustment costs onto surplus countries, the distributional conflicts there revolve around how the cost of adjustment is to be distributed among different societal groups.
Empirically, the project examines how vulnerability profiles affect domestic crisis politics and policies on two levels of analysis, the interest-group and the national level. It uses a mixed-methods research design that combines two sets of qualitative comparative case studies of the domestic politics of the euro crisis in surplus and deficit countries, respectively, with a quantitative analysis of national vulnerability profiles and crisis politics in a wider set of countries. The overarching goal of the project is to generate an encompassing picture of the distributional politics of the euro crisis and a better understanding of the constraints under which European policymakers operate in their attempts to solve the crisis.
More information can be found here.


Output and Work in Progress:


The Mass Politics of Disintegration

In the past few years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented popular backlash against international institutions. Popular demands to not only slow down, but to reverse international integration have proliferated, and have resulted in referendum and election outcomes that have reverberated across the world. Examples range from the Swiss 2014 mass immigration initiative over the British 2016 Brexit referendum to the 2016 election of a US President seemingly determined to withdraw US support from various international treaties. The implications of these mass-based disintegration efforts reach far beyond the countries in which they originate. First, the disintegration process is shaped by how remaining member states respond to one member’s bid to unilaterally change or terminate the terms of an existing international agreement. Second, mass-based disintegration bids also pose considerable risks of political contagion by encouraging disintegrative tendencies in other countries. Yet despite their disruptive nature, very little research exists beyond individual case studies on the general drivers, dynamics and challenges these instances of mass-based disintegration pose for international cooperation. This paper therefore engages in a comparative inquiry into the mass politics of disintegration that pays particular attention to the strategic dilemmas these instances pose for the affected international institutions and their remaining member states. It argues that the remaining member states have incentives to intervene in domestic campaigns in which disintegration figures as a viable outcome, but that the difficulties of successful intervention are considerable. It also shows that after a vote in favor of disintegration, the remaining member states face an “accommodation dilemma” between preserving as many cooperation gains as possible and making exit costly in order to discourage other member states from following suit.

Output and Work in Progress:


Globalization and Individual Policy and Partisan Preferences
This  project investigates how individuals’ exposure to global competition influences their feeling of economic security and a wide range of policy preferences, and how the emergence of new conflict lines between beneficiaries and losers of globalization changes the constituencies of political parties.I  argue that globalization has very heterogenous effects, which depend both on individuals' exposure to global competition and their factor-endowments. This suggests that even within the same industry, exposure to global competition can be harmful to some people, but not to others. In developed countries, high-skilled individuals in exposed industries or occupations can be characterized as “globalization winners,” because they can sell their skills to global markets. In contrast, low-skilled individuals working in an exposed sector face serious problems. The goods they produce are most likely to be substituted with imports from low-wage countries and their jobs are the most likely to be moved abroad, so that they can be classified as “globalization losers.” Individuals working in sheltered industries or occupations constitute an intermediate category. I use individual-level data to test the implications of these differentiated effects of globalization.


Output and Work in Progress:

Micro-Level Consequences of Financial Crises

This project examines how individuals respond to financial crises. It includes studies on the effect of foreign currency lending on individual political opinions in Eastern Europe, survey-research in Greece, and individual-level studies on public opinion during the 2008-10 Latvian financial and economic crisis. In a collaborative effort with colleagues from the University of York, Oxford University and IE University, we have run several surveys of public opinion on crisis management and the euro in Greece (July 2015, September 2015, December 2015, and February 2017).

Output and Work in Progress:




Crisis Management and Crisis Politics in the Global Financial Crisis and the Euro Crisis

This project analyzes policy responses, crisis politics, and distributive outcomes of national crisis management towards the global financial crisis and the euro crisis.


Output and Work in Progress:


The Politics of Delayed Adjustment and Crisis

Why are some policymakers able to adjust their policies in response to deteriorating economic conditions, while other policymakers delay adjustment as long as possible, a policy path that typically ends with an economic crisis? This project examines this question by focusing on the area of exchange-rate policy, where delayed devaluations frequently end with a currency crisis. The project extends my research on exchange-rate politics and analyses how exchange-rate level preferences interact with institutions to shape monetary and exchange-rate policy outcomes. I am particularly interested in explaining time-inconsistencies in exchange-rate policymaking. The project examines how distributional and electoral concerns can create strong incentives for policymakers to delay adjustment as long as possible. I argue that these incentives are particularly strong when voters are very vulnerable to both exchange and interest rate adjustments. Major currency crashes are particularly likely when voters are highly exposed to exchange rate changes but even more vulnerable to internal adjustment policies, and when electoral incentives prevent timely reform.

This project was generously funded by the Fritz-Thyssen Foundation.


Output and Work in Progress:

  • Walter, Stefanie (2013): Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Walter, Stefanie (2011). The Fiscal Policy Implications of Balance of Payments Imbalances. In:  Anheier, Helmut and Regina List  (eds.) Governance Challenges and Innovations: Financial and Fiscal Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 89-114.
  • Walter, Stefanie (2009). Interests and Incentives to Delay Adjustment: Why Policymakers Fail to Address Early Signs of Trouble and How They Respond to Crises. Paper presented at the 2009 APSA Annual Convention in Toronto, Canada, 3-6 September 2009.
  • Walter, Stefanie and Thomas D. Willett (2012). Delaying the Inevitable. A Political Economy Approach to Currency Defenses and Depreciation. Review of International Political Economy. 19(1): 114-39.


Micro-Level Consequences of the 2008/9 Financial Crisis in Germany

This project examined how the 2008/9 global financial and economic crisis affected the outcome of the German federal elections 2009. Based on insights from research on economic voting, it investigates three main issues. First, it examines how the geographically diverse impact on of the crisis on local labor markets and the regional economy affected individual voting behavior and voting outcomes at the constituency level. Second, it investigates how subjective economic evaluation affected individual electoral behavior. A third part of the project examines how voters assessed the government's anti-crisis policies, such as public guarantees for banks and the so-called Abwrackprämie, and studies whether and how these assessments affected vote intentions. The project employs a mix of quantitative data (survey data and electoral records) and qualitative data from semi-structured interviews.

Output and Work in Progress:


Explaining Policy Responses to Speculative Attacks. The Political Economy of Currency Crises.
Dissertation Project, 2003-2007

My dissertation examined the question why some governments devalue their exchange rate in response to speculative pressure, while others are willing to defend their currency at any cost. Employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, I found that political and institutional factors (such as interest group preferences, regime type, or elections) play an important role in determining currency crisis outcomes.


Output and Work in Progress:





Prof. Dr. Stefanie Walter

Institute for Political Science

University of Zurich

Affolternstr. 56

8050 Zurich



+41 44 634 5832

walter -at-

Twitter: @stefwalter__


Now working paper (with Ignacio Hurado and Sandra Léon) on what the EU-27 public wants in the Brexit negotiations.


Paper on how foreign policymakers can influence domestic voting behavior in foreign policy referendums now out in International Organization: Noncooperation by popular vote: Expectations, foreign intervention, and the vote in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum (with Elias Dinas, Ignacio Jurado, and Nikitas Konstantinidis).


New working paper on the mass politics of international disintegration.


New working paper with Nils Redeker on the politics of Germany's non-adjustment in the euro crisis.


New article  in Comparative Political Studies with Tobias Rommel on how offshoring affects voting behavior for established and populist parties: "The Electoral Consequences of Offshoring"


New article in the Annual Review of Political Science with Jeffry Frieden on what caused the euro crisis and how distributive conflicts both between and within countries make its resolution so difficult: "Understanding the Political Economy of the Eurozone Crisis."


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